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Abstract
We examine the effects of and the incentives for increasing input efficiency within a spatially segregated
Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions whose utility functions depend on both wages and employment.
We show that with neoclassical as well as Leontief technology, unions raise wages to appropriate fully the
gains from labor-saving technological (or organisational) improvements, leaving the firm with no incentive
to invest in increasing the efficiency of workers. However, capital-saving technological improvement may be
profitable depending on the elasticity of substitution. Finally, we examine the implication of a fixed minimum
wage (or competitive labor market) in one country.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, with nations pursuing policies towards globalisation and free markets, the role
of trade unions in promoting innovation and growth has come under close scrutiny. There has
been a feeling that investment in improving the productivity of the workforce is less attractive to
employers in the presence of strong trade unions because the benefits of such investment may be
absorbed in higher wages. Where employers do face strong trade unions, investment in improving
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labor efficiency must be preceded by an understanding that employers would share the benefits
of such investment. In the absence of such an understanding, strong trade unions may discourage
investment in training.1
The intensity of labor training depends on many factors other than the presence of trade
unions. Frazis et al. (1998, pp. 23–24) examined the determinants of training in U.S. industries
and observed, “the presence of unions appears to have a negative effect on formal training . . .
the presence of a union is predicted to reduce the proportion of time spent in formal training by
0.6 percent.” The Michigan Time Study reported by Duncan and Stafford (1980) also found trade
unions to have a negative effect on training. However, opinions differ on the issue. Brown (1989),
for instance, cites works that find unions to have negative, positive and insignificant effects on
training. Apart from training, an increase in the efficiency of labor may occur in various other
ways, for example, through organisational reforms that also have financial implications for the
firm. The results of this paper are therefore not restricted to any particular type of labor-saving
innovation.
In contrast with a large proportion of research in this area, which is essentially empirical in
nature, we address the following question: in the presence of a monopoly trade union determining
the wage rate, does an improvement in the efficiency of either labor or capital benefit the producer?
This problem is examined in the context of the general equilibrium setting of a Cournot/Nash
duopoly, where the firms are assumed to be located in two different countries, avoiding the
complications of inter-firm labor mobility.2
This paper aims to examine the desirability of labor-saving and capital-saving technological
improvements from the employer’s point of view in the presence of monopoly trade unions. We
show that with monopoly trade unions, any gain from an improvement in labor productivity is
absorbed by increased wages even if the utility of the trade union depends both on wages and
the level of employment. This leaves the producers with no incentive to invest in labor training.
However, an increase in capital productivity may increase the profit of the firm.
We begin by considering the case of labor-saving and capital-saving technological changes in
the context of fixed coefficient (Leontief) production technology. The effects of allowing factor
substitutability are then examined in Section 3. Section 4 introduces asymmetries into the analysis
by first considering the case in which there is a trade union in only one of the countries and then
examining the effects of a minimum wage in the other country. Section 5 concludes the paper
with a summary of findings and suggestions for further research in this area.
2. The case of ﬁxed (Leontief) coefﬁcient technology
Consider a Cournot duopoly with two firms, i and j (each located in different countries), produc-
ing and selling a homogenous product in the international market. In order to avoid complications
arising out of exchange rate fluctuations, we assume prices are denoted in a common currency.
We assume a linear demand function,
P = a − bQ, Q =
∑
Qt (t = i, j; a, b > 0), (1)
1 Dowrick and Spencer (1994, pp. 334–337) examined the conditions under which labor-saving technological progress
will be opposed by the trade unions in a Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions.
2 Kemp et al. (1991) examined the case of an international economy with national trade unions that bargain on wages.
They were mainly interested in the long-run equilibrium in a trading world. In contrast, the problem addressed here is
microeconomic in nature.
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where P is the market price and Qt is the quantity of output produced by the tth firm using Kt and
Lt units of capital and labor, respectively. The production coefficients are fixed, implying zero
elasticity of substitution in production; thus,
Qtλt = Lt, Qtκt = Kt (λt, κt > 0), (2)
where λt and κt are the fixed labor and capital requirements of the tth firm for producing one unit
of output. The profit of firm i is given by
πi = PQi − wiLi − riKi.
Substituting Eqs. (1) and (2) we have
πi = aQi − bQ2i − bQiQj − wiλiQi − riκiQi.
In a Cournot duopoly, each firm maximises its profit subject to a given level of its rival’s output,
Qj. The equilibrium output configuration in the Cournot model is given by
Qi = 13b (a − 2wiλi − 2riκi + wjλj + rjκj). (3)
In the monopoly trade union model, wages are set by the trade unions, and the producers decide
the levels of employment given the wage rates (e.g., see Addison and Chilton, 1998). We assume
that the trade unions’ utility functions take the Cobb–Douglas form; thus, utility for the union of
firm t is given by3
Ut = wαtt L1−αtt (0 < αt < 1). (4)
One obvious consequence of this assumption is that in setting their wages the trade unions take






wαii (a − 2wiλi − 2riκi + wjλj + rjκj)1−αi .
Given wj , maximising Ui with respect to wi gives the trade union’s reaction function for wi,
wi = (2λi)−1αi(a − 2riκi + wjλj + rjκj). (5)






(4 − αiαj)−1[a(2 + αj) − riκi(4 − αj) + 2rjκj(1 − αj)]. (6)
From Eq. (6), it is clear that the unit labor cost wiλi is independent of λi. Since ri and κi are
fixed, the unit cost, ci = wiλi + riκi, remains the same even if λi is smaller due to a labor-saving
improvement in technology. In other words, if the productivity of labor increases, wages go up in
an equal proportion so that the unit labor cost remains unchanged.
Eq. (3) may be written as
Qi = 13b (a − 2ci + cj), (7)
3 The assumption of a trade union utility function implies that with parametric changes, the wages can move in either
direction.
4 In the special case when a trade union seeks to maximise the total wage bill, it will set α = 1/2.
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where ci and cj are the unit costs of production for firms i and j, respectively. Given wi and ri,
the unit cost ci is also given. Since ci is unaffected by an increase in labor productivity, the level
of output, Qi, also remains unchanged. Consequently, the profit of firm i remains unchanged.
Proposition 1 follows immediately.
Proposition 1. In a segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions, if capital and
labor are perfect complements in production, the ﬁrms have no incentive to invest in on-the-job
training to improve the efﬁciency of the workforce.
Although this neutrality result implies that wages go up after a labor-saving technological
change, it also follows that the level of employment in the firm falls. From the union’s point of
view, whether a labor-saving technological change is welcome or not depends on the relative
weight that it attaches to wages and employment in its utility function. Indeed, it is easy to show
that the union prefers labor-saving technological progress if αt > 0.5. To see this, multiplying Eq.
(4) by wα−1t /wα−1t and using Eq. (2), we have, Ut = w2αt−1t {(λtwt)Qt}1−αt . With labor-saving
technological progress, wt is higher, but wtλt and Qt are invariant with respect to wage changes.
Hence, the trade union will prefer labor-saving technological progress if αt > 0.5. The trade union
will oppose a labor-saving technological improvement if αt < 0.5 (see Dowrick and Spencer).
Therefore, in the case of αt ≤ 0.5, it follows that neither the firm nor the trade union is interested
in labor-saving technological improvements (even if they come at zero cost). This is indeed a
remarkable result. Clearly, the firm is uninterested in productivity investment because all the
gains are expropriated by the union. However, given the unions’ preferences over wages and
employment, even if they expropriate the full gains from the productivity improvement in terms
of increased wages, this is insufficient to compensate for the loss in employment. The only group
gaining from such a technological improvement would be those workers who avoid the cull and
enjoy higher wages.
So far we have established that in the fixed-coefficients model, for αt > 0.5, though the union
welcomes a labor-saving change in technology, the producer is not interested in investing for it.
In Section 3, we see that this neutrality result (with respect to the unit cost, profit and the quantity
of output produced) holds even if we assume factor substitutability, provided constant returns to
scale in production holds.
Note that if the trade union agrees to share the gains from labor-saving technological innovation
with the firm, then the introduction of such innovations may be profitable for the firm. For example,
if we assume a Nash-bargaining scenario where the wage rate is decided through a bargain between
the firm and the union (Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre, 2002), a firm may have an incentive to
introduce a labor-saving technology.
Turning to the productivity of capital, from Eq. (6) it is obvious that an increase in the produc-
tivity of capital (a reduction in κi) due to capital-saving technological progress will increase wi,




= −αi(4 − αj)
4 − αiαj > −1.
Since d(riκi) < 0, we have d(wiλi) + d(riκi) < 0, implying that capital-saving technological
progress in firm i must cause the unit cost, ci, to fall. Such progress will be welcomed by firm i
since a reduction in firm i’s unit cost increases both its output and its profit. Proposition 2 follows
immediately.
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Proposition 2. In a segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions, if capital and
labor are perfect complements in production, the ﬁrms have an incentive to invest in capital-
saving technological progress.
These findings support the common belief that in the presence of a strong union, employers
have a greater incentive to invest in capital-saving technological change than to improve the skills
of the workers. The employers consider the discounted stream of increased profits and introduce
the new technology only if this exceeds the associate cost.
3. The case of neoclassical technology
We assume, as before, a linear demand function given by Eq. (1). However, in order to accom-
modate factor substitutability we assume that the production functions exhibit constant returns to
scale with well-known neoclassical properties,
Qt = F (AtLt, BtKt) (t = i, j), (8)
where AtLt and BtKt are, respectively, the quantities of labor and capital employed, measured in
efficiency units. To start with, let At and Bt = 1, so that one unit of an efficient factor of production
is equivalent to one physical unit of the same factor of production. With constant returns to scale,




where lt is the quantity of labor used to produce one unit of output and st(= wtlt /(wtlt + rtkt)) is
the share of wages in the unit cost.
As in the previous section, we are assuming a Cournot duopoly where the Cournot–Nash
solution in outputs is given by Eq. (7) and the demand for labor is given by
Li = liQi = 13b (ali − 2cili + cjli). (10)
We also assume that the unions’ utility functions are of the Cobb–Douglas form as in Eq. (4).






wαii (ali − 2cili + cjli)1−αi . (11)
Maximising Eq. (11) with respect to wi yields, after some manipulation, the following first order
condition:
αili(a − 2ci + cj) + (1 − αi)wi dlidwi (a − 2ci + cj) − 2li
dci
dwi
(1 − αi)wi = 0. (12)
5 Note that in equilibrium (after adjustments in employment) the factors are paid according to their marginal revenue
productivity (=marginal revenue × marginal physical productivity). However, the wage–rental ratio (ω) is given by the
ratio of marginal physical products.
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Since the firms are minimising unit costs, from the properties of the minimum cost function (see




Substituting Eq. (13) in Eq. (12) and rearranging we get
(a − 2ci + cj)
{
αili + (1 − αi)wi dlidwi
}
− 2l2i (1 − αi)wi = 0.
Dividing through by li,
(a − 2ci + cj){αi + (1 − αi)ηi} − 2(1 − αi)wili = 0, (14)
where ηi is firm i’s elasticity of demand for labor at the unit level of output. Eq. (14) is the implicit
reaction function (Ri) of firm i’s trade union, given cj.
We are dealing with comparative static results, and hence the existence of a unique and stable
solution is essential. A necessary first step in verifying this involves re-specifying the reaction
function (14) using (15), which follows (see Biswas and McHardy, 2003). In equilibrium, the
relationship (15) holds between the (compensated) elasticity of demand for labor in firm t, ηt, and
the elasticity of substitution, σt, between labor and capital and the share of wages in the unit cost
(equal to the share of total wages in the total cost) for firm t, st:6
ηt = (1 − st)σt. (15)
Using Eqs. (14) and (15), we have,
(a − 2ci + cj){αi + (1 − αi)(1 − si)σi} − 2(1 − αi)wili = 0. (16)
Using Eq. (9) in Eq. (16) and re-arranging, the reaction function for firm i may be expressed as







Proposition 3. If the reaction functions Ri and Rj are continuous, an equilibrium solution of the
trade union bargaining model with factor substitutability exists. The equilibrium is unique and
stable.7
Having established that the model has the usual desirable properties for comparative static
analysis, we now consider the effects of labor-saving and capital-saving technical improvements
on profit. The following proposition is parallel to Proposition 1.
Proposition 4. In a segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions, if the produc-
tion functions are subject to constant returns to scale, the beneﬁts of labor-saving technological
6 As an example, let us consider the simple case of a Cobb–Douglas production function: Q = AK1−bLb. According to
Eq. (15), the (compensated) elasticity of demand for labor is η = (1 − b). In consumer theory, if the utility function is of
the Cobb–Douglas type the elasticity of demand is 1. This is because, apart from the substitution effect, there is also the
income effect. However, in production theory, the income effect is zero; thus, the factor demand curve is a compensated
demand curve. Therefore, the elasticity of demand for labor is (1 − b).
7 The Proof of Proposition 3 and all subsequent propositions (except 5) are given in Appendix A which is available on
the JEBO website.
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progress will be fully absorbed in wage increases so that the unit cost, proﬁt and the quantity of
output produced will remain unaltered: ﬁrms will have no incentive to invest in improving the
productivity of the workforce.
According to Proposition 4, a labor-saving technological change in firm i does not affect the
reaction function Ri; hence, the equilibrium is also unaffected.
Let us now study the effect of capital-saving technological progress where a smaller amount
of new capital is as productive as that of the original quantity of old capital. Capital-saving
technological progress implies that given the same wage–rental ratio, the capital–labor ratio
(capital measured in terms of efficiency) will be higher per unit output.8
Of course, a firm will introduce capital-saving technological improvements only if they are
profitable. Therefore, in Eq. (8) an increase in Bt (capital-saving technological progress) must still
be profitable for the firm after taking into account the revised wage demands of the trade union.
In what follows, in the context of capital–labor substitutability and monopoly trade unions, we
shall show that whether capital-saving technological progress is or is not profitable for the firm
depends on the elasticity of substitution.
3.1. The case of Cobb–Douglas production technology
Since rental is given, an increase in the efficiency of capital implies that the cost of a unit
of efficient capital has fallen. Provided the wage rate does not increase, if the firm wishes to
employ the same amount of labor with the same amount of efficient capital (less physical capital)
to produce one unit of output, the unit cost will be lower. However, the trade union may decide
to set a higher wage rate. For example, let the production function be of the Cobb–Douglas
type: Qt = ¯AtLβtt K1−βtt . In this case, st = MRt(MPLtlt)/(MRt(MPLtlt + MPKtkt)) = βt, and σt = 1,
where MRt, MPLt and MPKt are, respectively, the marginal revenue, marginal productivity of
labor and marginal product of capital for firm t. Since βt and σt are independent of wages and
rental, then the right hand side in Eq. (17) is also invariant with respect to wages and rental.
Therefore, to restore the balance in Eq. (17) following the fall in ci due to labor-saving or capital-
saving technological progress, the trade union will ask for a higher wage so that the unit cost
remains unaltered. Proposition 5 follows immediately.
Proposition 5. In a segregated Cournot duopoly with monopoly trade unions, if the production
function is of the Cobb–Douglas type, no matter what variety of technological progress takes
place, all the beneﬁts of the technological progress will be absorbed in higher wages by the
monopoly trade union, so the ﬁrm has no incentive to invest in improving the productivity of
capital.
3.2. The case of CES production technology
We have seen that capital-saving technological progress increases the profitability of a firm
in the case of fixed coefficients (σ = 0), but has no effect on profitability where the production
functions are Cobb–Douglas (σ = 1). We now examine the case of 0 < σ < 1. We assume a constant
8 In the growth literature, technological progress induced by an increase in the efficiency of labor (capital) is known as
labor (capital) augmenting technological progress.
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elasticity of substitution (CES) production function to keep the problem solvable, thus,
Qt = ¯At[γt(BtKt)−ρ + βt(AtLt)−ρ]−1/ρ 0 < σ = 11 + ρ < 1. (18)
Our assumption, σ < 1, implies ρ > 0. Since we are considering changes in capital productivity
here, the productivity of labor is assumed to remain the same, that is, At = 1. In this case, given
Eq. (18), the share of wages in the unit cost turns out to be
st = βt( ¯Atlt)−ρ. (19)
Before we proceed further, we note that in the reaction function Ri given by Eq. (17), only the
variable cj from firm j affects ci, si and all other variables in firm i. Similarly, Rj, cj, sj and all other
variables in firm j are affected only by ci in firm i. Hence, along the reaction function Rj, cj will
be affected only by capital-saving technological progress in firm i if ci is affected. For example,
if the trade unions increase wi in a way that ci is unaffected, then the technological change in firm
i will not have any impact on cj.
Proposition 6. With CES production technology and σ <1, if a capital-saving technological
improvement takes place in ﬁrm i, the reaction function Ri will shift to the left, leading to smaller
unit costs ci and cj in equilibrium.
In the case of σ < 1, we can only say that given cj, ci will decrease with technological progress.
However, we cannot say whether the wage rate wi will increase or decrease.
The case of σ > 1 (i.e., ρ < 0) is too difficult to analyse at this level of generality because of the
difficulty in predicting the direction in which the trade union will change the wage rate: hence
we cannot predict the direction in which Ri will shift. However, this case is also uninteresting for
two reasons. First, in the context of CES production technology, σ > 1 implies the possibility that
output can be produced either by labor or by capital alone. Second, empirically this is an unusual
case. Rowthorn (1999) contains estimates of the elasticity of substitution for several European
countries, the U.S., Australia, Canada and Japan. Except for the spurious case of Canada, the
estimates of σ for all other countries are significantly below 1.
Proposition 7. With CES production technology and σ <1, the introduction of capital-saving
technological progress in ﬁrm i increases the proﬁt of ﬁrm i and reduces the proﬁt of ﬁrm j.
Proposition 7 implies that if the constant returns to scale production function of firm i is of
the CES type with the elasticity of substitution being less than 1, investment in capital-saving
technological improvement, through the use of more efficient capital inputs, increases the profit
of the firm. On the other hand, by Proposition 4, labor–saving technological progress, due to
improved efficiency of labor through training, does not change the profit of the firm because the
gain in profit is eaten away by an increase in the wage rate set by the trade union.
4. Asymmetric union power and minimum wages
The role of interdependency that characterises the Cournot model is important to note. Suppose
the labor market for firm j is perfectly competitive with a constant wage, wj . In this case the unit
cost, cj, is constant, and the reaction function, Rj, is horizontal to the ci-axis (see Fig. 1). If σi < 1,
an increase in the productivity of labor will shift the reaction function from Ri to R′i. The unit cost
ci will drop to c′i if firm i has a monopoly trade union but firm j does not. On the other hand, if firm
j also has a monopoly trade union, ci will drop to c′′i with the improvement in labor productivity.
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Fig. 1. Equilibrium under asymmetric input market structure.
From firm i’s point of view, the benefit from increased labor productivity is higher if firm j has
a monopoly trade union. The reason is simple. A reduction in ci will have an adverse effect on
output and employment in firm j, causing the trade union for firm j to reduce its wage rate. This
will trigger a retaliatory cut in wi and result in a further reduction in ci. In the absence of a drop
in cj, there will be a smaller reduction in ci.
This observation has an interesting implication for regulatory minimum wages (which are
usually analysed in the domestic context) in the international context. Suppose, in country j, there
is a regulatory minimum wage. This implies that the reaction function Rj is horizontal to the
ci-axis as in Fig. 1. A capital-saving technological improvement in country i does not affect cj
but reduces ci by an amount (ci − c′i), which is less than (ci − c′′i ). It is easy to show that in this
case, the profit of firm i will be less than if wages were flexible. On the other hand, the profit for
firm j will be higher (will fall less) than if wages were flexible. Note,
πi = 19b (a − 2ci + cj)
2, πj = 19b (a − 2cj + ci)
2.






















where ci and c′i are the values of ci associated with equilibria E and E′ in Fig. 1 (note, ci is
negative). When wages are flexible in firm j (i.e., trade unions are willing to accept a lower real
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From Eq. (17) and the Proof of Proposition 3, cj > 2ci − a. Therefore, (cj − c′′j ) > 2(c′i − c′′i ), the
profit of firm i will be smaller and the profit of firm j will be larger (will fall less) under flexible
wages than when firm j faces a minimum wage regime. The reason lies with the interdependency of
firm wages. Under a binding regulatory minimum wage in firm j, if a capital-saving technological
improvement takes place in firm i, the drop in the wage in firm i will be smaller and it works out
that the profit of the firm will be lower.
5. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we considered a modified Cournot duopoly model with spatially segregated
firms each of whom faces a monopoly trade union. We have shown that if production coeffi-
cients are fixed or the production functions are subject to constant returns to scale, labor-saving
technological improvements in a firm will only increase the wage rate set by its trade unions
and will have no effect on other variables (notably, the profit of the firm) in the system. Hence,
the firm has no incentive to invest in making its workers more productive. On the other hand,
the introduction of capital-saving technological improvement in a firm may increase its profit.
Hence, in a regime of monopoly trade unions, the firms should be interested in capital-saving
rather than in labor-saving improvements. Interdependence in the wage setting process by the
trade unions is important. If there is a binding regulatory minimum wage in one country or
the labor market in that country is competitive, then it transmits a degree of inflexibility in
wages to the other country. If any capital-saving technological improvement takes place in the
firm in the other country, its effect on profit will be reduced because of a smaller reduction
in wages.
This paper uses the framework of non-co-operative games. Hence, in the presence of monopoly
trade unions, no investment in labor training is carried out. As a result, the workers as well as
the employers suffer. This calls for co-operation in restraining the increase in wages. A firm must
agree (or have an understanding) with the trade union on a scheme of wage settlement before it
decides to install a scheme of labor training. Such co-operative behaviour seems to exist in many
industrialised countries such as Germany and Japan. Even if both parties agree on a scheme, what
is the guarantee that the trade unions will stick to their commitment? Note that investment in
labor training is an on-going process and employers can discontinue their expenditure on labor
training at any time if the unions do not keep to their promises. Hence, the co-operative game is
played repeatedly. Given any time-discount rate, there must exist a suitable threat strategy that
will support the co-operative agreement. In the context of investment in physical capital, several
authors have addressed the question of stability of the co-operative solution in wage settlement.9
However, for the government, rather than rely upon the possibility of co-operation between firms
and unions, it may be desirable to adopt a policy of influencing the monopoly trade unions so that
they do not expropriate all the gains from improvements in labor productivity.
Finally, in this paper, we assumed that all the agents in the model have perfect information. A
firm and its trade union in one country may not know that the firm in the other country has been
able to reduce its costs unless the other firm reveals its technology through taking patents, but the
other firm may not be interested in taking patents because the period of patenting is too short. An
interesting area of further research would be to explore firms’ strategies under asymmetric cost
information.
9 For example, see Baldwin (1983), Espinosa and Rhee (1989) and Addison and Chilton.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3. Using Eq. (17), the equation of Ri may be written as 2ci = (a + cj)ξi
(where 0 < ξi < 1), or, cj = 2ci/ξi − a. Therefore, cj > 2ci − a, and the reaction function of firm i
(Ri) starts from the point (aξi/2, 0). Using a similar argument, the reaction function Rj starts
from the point (0, aξj/2) and ci > 2cj − a. The reaction functions Ri and Rj with values of ci and
cj that satisfy the conditions: (i) ci, cj > 0, (ii) cj > 2ci − a and (iii) ci > 2cj − a are bounded and
continuous. Hence, a solution must exist. The intercepts of Ri and Rj with the ci-axis and the
cj-axis, respectively, are positive. Also note that since ξi and ξj are less than 1, the slopes of Ri
and Rj with respect to the ci-axis are greater than 2 and less than 1/2, respectively (see Fig. 2). At
the point of intersection, Ri must intersect Rj from below. Hence, the equilibrium is unique and
stable. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let (w∗i , l∗i , w∗j , l∗j ) be the solution obtained by solving Eq. (14) simul-
taneously for i and j. A labor-saving technological change in firm i implies that, in Eq. (8), Ai
increases from 1 to 1 + δ (where δ > 0). If the wage rate per unit of physical labor is multiplied
by 1 + δ, the wage per unit of efficient labor remains the same as before. Note that Eq. (8) is
unaffected except that Ai has a higher value. Given the same efficiency wage and rental, the firm
will employ the same amounts of efﬁcient labor and capital per unit of output (i.e., the firm i will
employ li/(1 + δ) units of physical labor per unit of output). Hence, the unit labor cost is unaffected.
Since the firm also employs the same amount of capital, the unit cost remains the same. By Eq.
(7), the same amount of output will be produced, implying the same amount of profit for firm
Fig. 2. The equilibrium.
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i. Eq. (14) is also satisfied with the same wage per unit of efficient labor because both the labor
cost, wili, and ηi remain the same. The elasticity of demand for efficient labor remains the same
because the efficient wage is the same and the unit isoquant, in terms of efficient inputs, is the
same. Furthermore, the elasticity of demand for physical labor (ηi) with respect to the wage paid
to physical labor is the same as the elasticity of demand for efficient labor. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose Ri does not shift to the left (i.e., for a particular value of cj,
ci is higher or the same on the reaction function Rj). However, given the same wage rate wi,
the capital-saving technological improvement must reduce ci. Therefore, the only reason for ci
to be higher or the same is that the trade union has set wi at a higher level. With capital-saving
technological progress, a higher wage rate implies that li is lower for two reasons. First, given
the same wi, li is lower due to capital-saving technological progress. Second, li is lowered further
by the increase in wi. Since, ρ > 0 by assumption, Eq. (19) implies that si is higher. By Eq. (17),
given cj = wjlj/sj , ci must have a lower value if si is higher. Thus, the proposition is proved by
contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 7. The profit of the firm i is given by
πi = (P − ci)Qi = [a − b(Qi + Qj) − ci]Qi = 19b (a − 2ci + cj)
2.
Profit, πi, will increase if −2ci > cj. In view of Proposition 3, a capital-saving technological
improvement implies that both ci and cj are negative. Hence, πi will increase if 2|ci| > |cj|.
By Proposition 3, Ri shifts to the left implying that the equilibrium moves to the left along the
reaction function Rj. Since, the slope of Rj is less than 1/2 everywhere, |ci| > |cj|. Hence, πi
must increase. The profit of firm j is given by
πj = 19b (a − 2cj + ci)
2;
hence, πj is positive if 2|cj| > |ci|. Since, the slope of Rj is less than 1/2 everywhere,
2|cj| > |ci|. Hence, πj must decrease. 
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